Robin Vander Wall
Put simply, relief hasn’t been granted to RSOs under this theory because the Court hasn’t had occasion to consider the question or the analogy. I can see how you’re extending the argument and it makes some sense to me. But, that’s just academic. For the Court to provide relief of any kind, relief must first be sought….and that requires a long and arduous process beginning in a federal district court and ending at the U.S. Supreme Court (IF it is willing to hear whatever question survives all the legal wrangling underneath).
In response to your second question, I think that it’s difficult to say. NO court (outside of Colorado) has yet to state that the essential requirement to register, in and of itself, is unconstitutional. Registration was not under assault in the Michigan case. The enhancements (added restrictions and requirements) were under assault in Snyder. So, just speculating here, but I suspect that the answer to your question is probably no. It will likely not provide relief to people who were required to retroactively register years after the date of their convictions. The Sixth Circuit has not declared registration itself as punishment. It has declared the consequences (either intended or collateral) of being registered punishment and, therefore, unconstitutional. How Michigan’s legislature responds to that is essential to ascertaining subsequent and prospective legal opportunities.