In Padilla, didn’t the SCOTUS say that they make no distinction between civil/collateral versus punitive consequence because “deportation is intimately related to the criminal justice system”; therefore, Padilla had a right to prior knowledge of the mandatory deportation consequences of his plea.
If the above logic was applied to a defendant whose attorney had access to legislation that mandated his deportation, why would the SCOTUS’s same logic not be applied to RSO’s who had their right to reflection denied via absence of existing legislation that become “mandatory” once passed if their pleas were entered prior to the registry’s creation? It would be impossible to argue that SORNA, AWA or Megan’s Law are not “intimately related to the criminal justice system.” Yet in Doe v. Alaska, did SCOTUS not say that the registry was a civil, collateral consequence of a prior conviction and not punishment? Seems as if that is a big contradiction to their Padilla language. Why are those RSO’s who pleas were entered prior to the 1994 enactment not granted relief as was Padilla.
Also, does the 6th DISTRICT’s ruling apply to the removal of registrants whose original offense pre-dates any registration laws whatsoever, thereby allowing them to move to any State in the 6th DISTRICT without having to register since the words ex-post facto punishment are included in the ruling?
Really appreciate your knowledge in such matters, and would love to know what you think.